All found by the multi-angle /code-review over the branch and verified
against the installed libraries:
- 401 discriminator: the session-expiry redirect keyed off a path prefix
(!/auth/*) and falsely logged users out on /profile/change-password
with a wrong current password. requireAuth's no-session 401 now carries
the distinct AUTH_REQUIRED code — the only signal api.ts dispatches
auth:expired on; wrong-credential 401s keep AUTH_ERROR on any path.
Test updated to pin the code-based contract on both directions.
- OIDC RFC 9207: exchangeAndVerifyTokens rebuilt the callback URL with
only code+state, dropping the iss parameter openid-client v6 validates
when the provider advertises support (authentik does) — every OIDC
login would fail post-upgrade. The full callback query is now forwarded.
- OIDC http issuers: v6 enforces HTTPS on discovery/endpoints (v5
didn't) — breaking internal http:// providers on Docker networks.
OIDC_ALLOW_INSECURE_HTTP=true opts back in (documented in .env.example).
- 2FA downgrade: authService's webauthn fallback caught ANY challenge
error and silently downgraded to password-only login; now only the
stale-flag 'No registered WebAuthn credentials' case falls through,
everything else rethrows.
- Burned-challenge retry: the server consumes the single-use 2FA
challenge before verifying (anti-replay), so after a server rejection
a retry can only ever return 'Challenge expired'. LoginPage now resets
to sign-in on server failure (WebAuthn AND the pre-existing TOTP trap);
a browser-prompt cancel keeps retry (token still live). Also lazy-loads
@simplewebauthn/browser out of the entry bundle, matching ProfilePage.
Server 252/252, client 52/52, OIDC smoke 44/44, probe 33/33, e2e 27.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
authService.login returns a requires_webauthn payload for webauthn-enabled
users, but the login route only handled requires_totp and fell through to
result.user.id (undefined) -> TypeError -> 500 on every attempt. Any user who
enabled WebAuthn via the API (reachable today) was permanently locked out.
- routes/auth.cts: return the two-step requires_webauthn payload (mirrors TOTP)
- services/authService.cts: stale-flag guard — webauthn_enabled with no usable
credentials falls through to password login instead of hard-failing
- tests/authLoginWebauthnRoute.test.js: pins both paths + wrong-password 401
(QA-B1-01, lockout part)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
utils/logger.cts — console-compatible log.{debug,info,warn,error} with:
- level gating (LOG_LEVEL; debug in dev / info in prod), and
- REDACTION of secrets/PII (sensitive keys + bearer/JWT) so tokens,
passwords, and encrypted values never reach the logs (financial app).
Backend is abstracted (console now, swappable to pino later).
Swept all 317 server-runtime console.* across 35 files → log.* + inserted
the import at correct scope. tests/logger.test.js pins the redaction
contract (4 tests). CODE_STANDARDS updated; raw console.* is now banned in
server code.
Verified: check:server + typecheck:server + lint clean; 240/240 server
tests; client 50/50; build; e2e probe 17/17; boot smoke logs flow through
the logger and graceful shutdown intact.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two of the large foundational services. billsService (validation/normalization,
balance math) is required by many others; notificationService (email + push +
drift digest) uses the shared http types indirectly.
Behavior-preserving. Verified: typecheck:server 0, check:server 0, suite 226/226.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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