All found by the multi-angle /code-review over the branch and verified
against the installed libraries:
- 401 discriminator: the session-expiry redirect keyed off a path prefix
(!/auth/*) and falsely logged users out on /profile/change-password
with a wrong current password. requireAuth's no-session 401 now carries
the distinct AUTH_REQUIRED code — the only signal api.ts dispatches
auth:expired on; wrong-credential 401s keep AUTH_ERROR on any path.
Test updated to pin the code-based contract on both directions.
- OIDC RFC 9207: exchangeAndVerifyTokens rebuilt the callback URL with
only code+state, dropping the iss parameter openid-client v6 validates
when the provider advertises support (authentik does) — every OIDC
login would fail post-upgrade. The full callback query is now forwarded.
- OIDC http issuers: v6 enforces HTTPS on discovery/endpoints (v5
didn't) — breaking internal http:// providers on Docker networks.
OIDC_ALLOW_INSECURE_HTTP=true opts back in (documented in .env.example).
- 2FA downgrade: authService's webauthn fallback caught ANY challenge
error and silently downgraded to password-only login; now only the
stale-flag 'No registered WebAuthn credentials' case falls through,
everything else rethrows.
- Burned-challenge retry: the server consumes the single-use 2FA
challenge before verifying (anti-replay), so after a server rejection
a retry can only ever return 'Challenge expired'. LoginPage now resets
to sign-in on server failure (WebAuthn AND the pre-existing TOTP trap);
a browser-prompt cancel keeps retry (token still live). Also lazy-loads
@simplewebauthn/browser out of the entry bundle, matching ProfilePage.
Server 252/252, client 52/52, OIDC smoke 44/44, probe 33/33, e2e 27.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The backend existed since 99abca9 with no way to reach it (QA-B1-01).
Now wired:
- LoginPage: requires_webauthn second step mirrors TOTP — the key prompt
fires automatically after the password; cancel/retry + back-to-sign-in
- ProfilePage: PasskeySection (mirrors TotpSection) — enroll with a name,
list keys, password-gated per-key remove + remove-all
- webauthnService: WEBAUTHN_ORIGIN stays authoritative; otherwise accept
the browser's origin when its hostname equals the RP ID — fixes real
dev/e2e enrollment where the Vite UI port differs from the API port
(the browser already enforces RP ID ⊆ origin, so no widened trust)
- Deploy safety: WEBAUTHN_RP_ID documented in .env.example + a boot-time
prod warning in utils/env.cts (localhost-bound keys silently fail
behind a real domain)
- e2e/webauthn.probe.spec.js: CDP virtual authenticator drives the full
lifecycle (enroll -> key sign-in -> password-gated removal), retiring
Cycle 1's 'needs a human with a key' assumption. Probe suite 18/18.
Server 252/252, client 52/52, typecheck + build clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Full-deployment QA against a copy of the real DB surfaced launch/require
references the server .cts migration didn't update. All are non-source
tooling/edge paths, which is why typecheck/check/tests stayed green:
- e2e/setup/prepare-db.js: require('../../db/database') and
require('../../scripts/seedDemoData') → .cts. This broke `npm run
test:e2e*` entirely (harness couldn't load). [material]
- playwright.config.js + scripts/prod-smoke.sh: webServer/boot command
`node server.js` → `node server.cts`. Also blocked the e2e + prod-smoke
suites. [material]
- setup/firstRun.js → .cts, require('../services/auditService') → .cts,
and server.cts call site → require('./setup/firstRun.cts'). Latent:
server.cts only reaches firstRun when userCount===0, but database.cts
auto-seeds a default admin during getDb() first, so the path isn't hit
in normal boot — fixed defensively so it can't crash if ever reached.
- .env.example: doc reference `node server.js` → server.cts.
Verified: typecheck:server + check:server clean; server test suite
226/226; e2e probe 17/17 (was 0 — suite couldn't boot before); the
production Docker image builds and boots on a copy of the real
production DB (44 bills, 1159 payments) with /api/health 200 and all 64
page endpoints returning 2xx.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- encryptionService.js: getKey() tries TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY env first, then
auto-generates a random 48-byte key on first startup, persists to settings
as _auto_encryption_key. assertEncryptionReady() is now a no-op.
- bankSyncConfigService.js: removed encryption_key_set response and
encryptionKeyReady() helper. No env config required.
- .env.example: TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY removed. Comment says enable from Admin
panel, no env config required.
- BankSyncSection.jsx: added SimpleFIN Bridge links — 'Open SimpleFIN Bridge'
for first-time setup, 'Get a SimpleFIN token' for existing connections
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