Commit Graph

4 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
null 135bd98c6a refactor(server): migrate middleware, workers, and db layer to TypeScript (.cts)
- middleware/ (5): requireAuth, securityHeaders, errorFormatter, csrf,
  rateLimiter — fully typed against the shared http Req/Res/Next types.
- workers/dailyWorker — fully typed.
- db/ (4): database, subscriptionCatalogSeed, migrations/versionedMigrations,
  migrations/legacyReconcileMigrations — large dynamic schema/migration infra,
  converted with @ts-nocheck (typing deferred). All requires updated to .cts.

Behavior-preserving. Verified: typecheck:server 0, check:server 0, suite 226/226.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
2026-07-06 11:34:08 -05:00
null 005b0b7b64 refactor(server): migrate 10 services to TypeScript (.cts)
Continues the incremental server TS migration (after utils/*.mts and
paymentValidation.cts): converts 10 services to .cts (CommonJS TypeScript,
run natively via Node type-stripping — no build step), type-checked by
tsconfig.server.json.

Migrated: totpService, amountSuggestionService, encryptionService,
paymentAccountingService, statusService, aprService, driftService,
analyticsService, spendingService, billMerchantRuleService.

- types/db.d.ts: shared minimal better-sqlite3 Db/Statement types (the lib
  ships none), reused across the migrated modules.
- Every require of a migrated service updated to the explicit .cts extension
  (extensionless require does not resolve .cts) across routes / services /
  db migrations / server.js / workers / tests — require-only changes.
- package.json: check:server find pattern now includes *.cts (it silently
  skipped .cts before, so paymentValidation.cts had no node --check gate).

Behavior-preserving (types only). Verified: typecheck:server 0,
check:server 0, full server suite 226/226, real boot → /api/health 200.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
2026-07-06 10:35:29 -05:00
null 1457de487f feat(security): show a key fingerprint (not the key) in the encryption status
The encryption key must never be retrievable through the app (that would undo
the whole point of TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY — a stolen session/XSS could then read
the master key). Instead surface a non-reversible fingerprint so operators can:
- verify which key is currently active,
- confirm a running instance matches the key they backed up, and
- spot an accidental key change (which would make existing secrets unrecoverable).

- encryptionService.keyFingerprint(): domain-separated SHA-256 prefix of the
  active key (env if set, else the stored DB key); never force-creates a key
  (returns null when none exists), shares nothing with the cipher derivation.
- admin bank-sync-config exposes key_fingerprint alongside encryption_key_source.
- Admin Bank Sync card renders it with backup guidance.
- Test: stable per key, differs by key, not reversible / not the raw key.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
2026-07-05 19:15:32 -05:00
null b95f771d18 test(security): lock in encryptionService — the secret-at-rest crown jewel (Phase 1)
Zero coverage on the AES-256-GCM + HKDF crypto that protects SimpleFIN
bank tokens, TOTP/recovery secrets, SMTP/OIDC creds and login-history
PII. A silent break in decryptSecret or the startup reEncryptWithEnvKey
migration would render every stored secret unrecoverable, invisibly.

Covers: round-trip on both key paths (env e2: / db v2:), unicode/empty/
large payloads, GCM tamper rejection, legacy (pre-v0.78 SHA-256) decrypt,
the env-key-required error, and the migration (migrate/skip/idempotent/
corrupt-tolerant). Suite 200 green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
2026-07-05 12:55:51 -05:00