# Guards — how to write a check that actually checks ``` Status: Current Owner: Last reviewed: Governs: structural tests, source-grep assertions, probes, and any check whose passing is taken as evidence Review trigger: A guard is found to have been passing while the thing it guards was broken; a new class of check is added to the suite. ``` A guard that cannot fail is worse than no guard, because it is trusted. Every rule here was learned by finding one that had been green for months over something broken. ## 1. Prove the guard fails before you believe it passes The one discipline that matters most, and it takes thirty seconds: ```bash cp src/lib/thing.ts /tmp/thing.bak # break exactly the thing the test protects sed -i 's/if (body.error)/if (false)/' src/lib/thing.ts npx vitest run tests/thing.test.ts # expect: exactly one failure cp /tmp/thing.bak src/lib/thing.ts npx vitest run tests/thing.test.ts # expect: green again ``` **Exactly one** is the part people skip. If breaking the guard's target fails three tests, two of them are coincidental and will mask a real regression later. If it fails none, the guard is decoration — and you have just learned that for the price of one `sed`. `scripts/prove-guard.sh` performs exactly this, which removes the two ways it gets skipped: the restore is a `trap`, so an interrupted run cannot leave the code broken, and the failure count comes from the runner's own summary rather than from eyeballing red — one failing test is routinely reported on half a dozen lines, and counting those calls a clean result six coincidental failures. Do this when you write a guard, and again when you change what it guards. A test written alongside the code it tests has never been observed failing. ## 2. A source-grep guard must tell code from the comment about code Structural tests that assert a file does *not* contain some pattern will match the docblock explaining why that pattern is forbidden. So the clearest possible comment breaks the test, and the obvious fix is to delete the explanation. Strip comments first: ```ts const codeOf = (path: string) => readFileSync(path, "utf8") .split("\n") .filter((line) => !/^\s*(\*|\/\/|\{\/\*)/.test(line)) .join("\n"); expect(codeOf("src/lib/thing.ts")).not.toContain("dangerouslySetInnerHTML"); ``` Otherwise the guard quietly punishes documenting the rule it exists to enforce — which is exactly backwards, because the comment is how the next person learns the rule at all. ## 3. Pin the behaviour, not the spelling A guard should fail when the protected behaviour breaks and stay quiet otherwise. One that asserts on a variable name fails on a rename that changed nothing. ```ts // Brittle: breaks when the variable is renamed, while the fallback it protects // is untouched. expect(route).toContain("readAsset(project.forgejoRepo"); // Pins the behaviour: the route fetches through the wrapper that tries both // spellings, and never through the raw reader. expect(route).toMatch(/readAsset\(\s*\w+,\s*ASSETS\[which\]\s*\)/); expect(body).not.toContain("readFileBytes("); ``` A guard that fails on changes it does not care about is one people learn to edit rather than heed, and the edit is usually deletion. ## 4. A negative result is only as good as the probe that produced it "The check found nothing" and "the check did not run" are different facts, and they look identical from the outside. Before reporting an absence, prove the instrument worked: ```bash # Not this alone — an unreadable file produces the same silence as an unset key grep -c '^WANTED=' /proc/$PID/environ # Establish the read succeeded first tr '\0' '\n' < /proc/$PID/environ | grep -c . # 0 here means "could not read" ``` This is the confident-absence failure one level up: the same trap as a screen rendering a failed query as a count of zero, applied to your own diagnosis. ## 5. A guard that is often wrong is worse than none A check with a high false-positive rate trains everybody to skip its output, including on the day it is right. One written for this template flagged **684 of 1142** candidates on its first run. That was not 684 findings, it was a broken heuristic — and shipping it would have taught its readers that the check is noise. Two rounds of narrowing brought it to 17 of 363, all of them real. If a new guard's first run is loud, tune it until it is quiet before anybody relies on it. Report the false-positive rate you settled at, so the next person knows what silence is worth. ## 6. Guards belong before the artifact exists A check that runs after publication catches the problem once it is somewhere it cannot be taken back from: the tag is in the registry, and refusing the commit afterwards leaves git with no record of it. Order the gates so the expensive, irreversible step is last — preconditions, guards, build, verify the built thing is what was asked for, publish, and record it last of all. ## 7. When the gate finds something that invalidates the operation, stop Printing a warning and continuing produces the worst outcome available: the bad thing happens *and* a reassuring summary appears above it. The question is not how bad the finding is. It is **whether it invalidates what the operation claims**: - A release whose test gate skipped half the suite — a release claims to be tested. **Refuse.** - A backup written to a group-readable directory — the backup is still a backup. **Warn.** Escape hatches are fine, and they have to be asked for by name, never be the default, and say plainly what is being given up. ## 8. Find the vacuous ones in one run: comment the whole tree out §1 proves one guard at a time, which is the right thing to do while writing one and far too slow for a suite that already exists. The audit that produced these rules found six vacuous guards by reading; the sweep below found forty in ninety seconds, because it asks every guard the same question at once. The question is the one the failure mode is named after. **What survives when the code is moved into a comment?** Every byte a source-grep can see is still there; nothing runs. ```bash # In a throwaway copy — never the working tree. cp -a repo /tmp/mutant && cd /tmp/mutant # Prefix every line of every source file with the language's comment marker. # Shell keeps line 1, so the shebang survives. npx vitest run --reporter=json --outputFile=/tmp/survivors.json ``` Then read out the tests that **passed**. Three kinds of answer come back: - **A test that claims to check behaviour.** "Refuses anywhere that is not Discord", "checks the guard before doing anything else", "never deletes what production is running". These are the findings. Every one is a `toContain` against source text whose docblock argues the same rule in the same words. - **A negative assertion** — `not.toContain`, or an empty-list expectation over a walk. These pass on an empty tree by construction and are not findings on their own. They need §4 applied instead: something in the file must prove the walk found anything and the pattern still matches. - **A structural check with nothing to do with source text** — file sizes, counts, a fixture asserting things about itself. Not findings. ### The sweep needs §4 applied to itself, and the first one here did not **Run it with the test database UNSET.** This is the trap that matters most, because it fails silently and in the flattering direction. With `TEST_DATABASE_URL` set, every database-backed file's `beforeAll` throws against the commented-out migration runner — and vitest marks every test in a file whose `beforeAll` threw as **skipped**, not failed. A skipped test is not a passing test, so it never appears in the survivor list. The first sweep run here was done that way: 42 files exploded at setup, their pure source-grep describes were never asked the question at all, and the answer came back **208 survivors** when the real figure was **502**. It undercounted by about 345 — and it undercounted by counting "could not check" as "nothing found", which is the exact confusion §4 exists to forbid. Unset the variable and those files' `beforeAll` returns early instead, so their non-database describes still run and still answer. **Prove the instrument before trusting the number.** A sweep that mutates nothing reports every test as a survivor; a sweep that deletes everything reports none. Assert that code survived the mutation *and* that the mutation happened — one guard here measured only how much its stripper removed, so 100% removal read as a healthy instrument. **Mutate every file a guard can read**, not just the obvious source tree. A first pass left `notices/`, `reporter/` and `radar/` intact and reported forty-four working tests as suspects. A later one missed `.forgejo/workflows/*.yml`, `src/db/migrations/*.sql`, `*.css` and `.npmrc` — five guards are only demonstrably red once those are included. **Write the mutated file from a variable you read first.** `open(p, "w").write(f(open(p).read()))` truncates before it reads, so it deletes the file rather than commenting it out, and a deletion proves something weaker. The recursion is the lesson worth keeping: the instrument built to find guards that cannot fail was itself a guard that could not fail, and it stayed wrong until somebody asked it the question it asks everything else. ## 9. `toThrow()` cannot tell "refused" from "broken" `expect(() => parse(url)).toThrow()` with no matcher is satisfied by any throw at all — including `TypeError: parse is not a function`, which is what a deleted export produces. An SSRF boundary asserted this way passes when the validator has been removed entirely. ```ts // Vacuous: green when parseWebhookUrl no longer exists. expect(() => parseWebhookUrl("https://evil.example/api/webhooks/1/t")).toThrow(); // Names the refusal, so a broken import is a failure rather than a pass. expect(() => parseWebhookUrl("https://evil.example/api/webhooks/1/t")) .toThrow(InvalidInputError); ``` The same applies to `rejects.toThrow()` on a database probe: name the constraint, or a typo in the table name passes as the constraint firing. ## 10. A floor over a walk is not a check on the walk `expect(routes.length).toBeGreaterThan(40)` is satisfied by 41, 57 and 500 equally, and `expect(actionFiles.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1)` was satisfied by a walk that found one of twenty-two files — while every other assertion in that file was an `it.each` over the same walk, so the run went green having checked almost nothing. When the real set is discoverable, derive it twice and compare: ```ts const independently = readdirSync(ADMIN_DIR, { recursive: true }) .map(String) .filter((entry) => entry.endsWith("page.tsx")); expect(pages).toHaveLength(independently.length); ``` Neither number is maintained by hand, adding a page fails nothing, and a walk that stopped entering `[slug]` directories is a failure rather than a smaller green run. ## 11. A guard armed by a field is only as armed as the sloppiest writer A guard that reads a field to decide whether to fire is armed only where every writer sets that field. The two writers you fixtured set it. The shared helper they both call defaults it to empty, and every other writer — present and future — writes that default straight past the guard. Nothing fails. Nothing logs. The fixtures stay green, because they exercise the writers that get it right. **The test to add is not another one about the guard. It is one about the default.** Either the default carries the safe value, or the field is not optional. A guard whose arming depends on every caller remembering an argument is not armed; it is armed *so far*. ## 12. A guard in one caller is a guard over that caller Putting the check inside the function that happens to be in front of you protects that path and no other. The next caller reaches the same resource by a different route and meets nothing. Count the ways in before deciding where the guard goes. If there is more than one, the guard belongs at the resource — or the resource belongs behind one door. ## 13. A guard that restates the list is a copy of the list A guard written to stop two lists drifting apart, which contains its own copy of one of them, is a third thing to keep in step. It passes by agreeing with itself. ```python # Wrong: the literal is a second copy, and adding a surface updates neither. check("every SURFACE is one the gate can see", set(SURFACES) == {"a", "b", "c", "d"}) # Right: derive both sides from the thing that decides. check("every SURFACE is one the gate can see", set(SURFACES) <= set(gate_reads())) ``` **Derive it, or justify the constant.** Ask the daemon, read the config, walk the schedule — do not restate it. Where a constant genuinely must be written down, say in a comment *where the authority is* and what would make it wrong. This is the narrow form of a rule `docs/WORK_CYCLE.md` requires every plan to answer: **hardcode as little as possible.** It is true of guards, and of everything else. Two limits, so it does not become a slogan: - **Something has to be the root.** A path, a channel id, a threshold taken from a real incident: those *are* the authority, not copies of one. The rule is against the **second** copy. - **Derive the input, never the assertion.** A probe that derives its own expectation from the thing it is testing proves nothing at all.